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Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, where a
player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So-called zero-determinant
(ZD) strategies enable a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player’s own payoff and
the co-player’s payoff regardless of the strategy of the co-player. In the present study, we analytically study
zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated (two-person) prisoner’s dilemma games with a general payoff
matrix. Our results are as follows. First, we present the forms of solutions that extend the known results for
infinitely repeated games (with a discount factor w of unity) to the case of finitely repeated games (0 < w < 1).
Second, for the three most prominent ZD strategies, the equalizers, extortioners, and generous strategies, we
derive the threshold value of w above which the ZD strategies exist. Third, we show that the only strategies
that enforce a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs are either the ZD strategies or unconditional
strategies, where the latter independently cooperates with a fixed probability in each round of the game, proving
a conjecture previously made for infinitely repeated games.
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1 Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma game models situations in which two individuals are involved in a social dilemma and
each individual selects either cooperation (C) and defection (D) in the simplest setting. Although an individual
obtains a larger payoff by selecting D regardless of the choice of the other individual, mutual defection, which
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, yields a smaller benefit to both players than mutual cooperation
does. We now know various mechanisms that enable mutual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game and
other social dilemma games [1–3], which inform us how cooperation is probably sustained in society of humans
and animals and how to design cooperative organisations and society.
One of the mechanisms enabling mutual cooperation in social dilemma games is direct reciprocity, i.e.,
repeated interaction, in which the same two individuals play the game multiple times. An individual that
defects would be retaliated by the co-player in the succeeding rounds. Therefore, the rational decision for both
players in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is to keep mutual cooperation if the number of iteration is
sufficiently large [1, 4, 5]. Generous tit-for-tat [6] and win-stay lose-shift (often called Pavlov) [7, 8] strategies
are strong competitors in evolutionary dynamics of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under noise, and a
population composed of them realizes a high level of mutual cooperation.
In 2012, when the study of direct reciprocity seemed to be matured, Press and Dyson proposed a novel class
of strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [9]. ZD strategies
impose a linear relationship between the payoff obtained by a focal individual and its co-player regardless of
the strategy that the co-player implements. A special case of the ZD strategies is the equalizer, with which
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the focal individual unilaterally determines the payoff that the co-player gains regardless of what the co-player
does, within a permitted range of the co-player’s payoff value (see [2, 10] for the previous accounts for this
strategy). As a different special case, the focal individual can set an “extortionate” share of the payoff that the
individual gains as compared to the co-player’s payoff. The advent of the ZD strategies has spurred new lines
of investigations of direct reciprocity. They include the examination and extension of ZD strategies such as
their evolution [11–22], multiplayer games [20,23–26], continuous action spaces [25–28], alternating games [28],
human reactions to computerized ZD strategies [29, 30], and human-human experiments [25, 31].
Most of the aforementioned mathematical and computational studies of the ZD strategies have been con-
ducted under the assumption of infinitely repeated games. While mathematically more elegant and advanta-
geous, finitely repeated games are more realistic than infinitely repeated games and comply with experimental
studies. In the present study, we examine the ZD strategies in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
There are a few studies that have investigated ZD strategies in finitely repeated games. Hilbe and colleagues
defined and mathematically characterized ZD strategies in finitely repeated games [32] (also see [29]). McAvoy
and Hauert analyzed ZD strategies in the finitely repeated donation game (i.e., a special case of the prisoner’s
dilemma game) in a continuous strategy space [27, 28]. Given these studies, our main contributions in the
present article are summarized as follows. First, we derive expressions for ZD strategies in finitely repeated
games that are straightforward extensions of those previously found for the infinitely repeated game. Second,
for the three most studied ZD strategies, we derive the threshold discount factor (i.e., how likely the next round
of the game occurs in the finitely repeated game) above which the ZD strategy can exist. Third, we prove that
imposing a linear relationship between the two individuals’ payoffs implies that the focal player takes either the
ZD strategy defined for finitely repeated games [32] or an unconditional strategy (e.g., unconditional cooperation
and unconditional defection), proving the conjecture in [15] in the case of finitely repeated games.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we explain the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, the strategies of interest (i.e., memory-
one strategies), and the expected payoffs. More thorough discussion of them is found in Refs. [2, 32, 33].
We consider the symmetric two-person prisoner’s dilemma game whose payoff matrix is given by
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
The entries represent the payoffs that the focal player, denoted by X , gains in a single round of a repeated
game. Each row and column represents the action of the focal player, X , and the co-player (denoted by Y ),
respectively. We assume that
T > R > P > S, (2)
which dictates the prisoner’s dilemma game. Both players obtain a larger payoff by selecting D than C because
T > R and P > S. We also assume that
2R > T + S, (3)
which guarantees that mutual cooperation is more beneficial than the two players alternating C and D in the
opposite phase, i.e., CD, DC, CD, DC, . . ., where the first and second letter represent the actions selected by
X and Y , respectively [5, 34]. The two players repeat the game whose payoff matrix in each round is given by
Eq. (1). A next round given the current round takes place with probability w (0 < w < 1), which is called the
discount factor.
Consider two players X and Y that adopt memory-one strategies, with which they use only the outcome of
the last round to decide the action to be submitted in the current round. A memory-one strategy is specified
by a 5-tuple; X ’s strategy is given by a combination of
p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) (4)
and p0, where 0 ≤ pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD, p0 ≤ 1. In Eq. (4), pCC is the conditional probability that X cooperates
when both X and Y cooperated in the last round, pCD is the conditional probability that X cooperates when
X cooperated and Y defected in the last round, pDC is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X
defected and Y cooperated in the last round, and pDD is the conditional probability that X cooperates when
both X and Y defected in the last round. Finally, p0 is the probability that X cooperates in the first round.
Similarly, Y ’s strategy is specified by a combination of
q = (qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD) (5)
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and the probability to cooperate in the first round, q0, where 0 ≤ qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD, q0 ≤ 1.
We refer to the first round of the repeated game as round 0. Because both players have been assumed to
use a memory-one strategy, the stochastic state of the two players in round t (t ≥ 0) is specified by
v(t) = (vCC(t), vCD(t), vDC(t), vDD(t)) , (6)
where vCC(t) is the probability that both players cooperate in round t, vCD(t) is the probability that X cooper-
ates and Y defects in round t, and so forth. The normalization is given by vCC(t)+vCD(t)+vDC(t)+vDD(t) = 1
(t = 0, 1, . . .). The initial condition is given by
v(0) = (p0q0, p0(1 − q0), (1− p0)q0, (1− p0)(1 − q0)) . (7)
Because the expected payoff to player X in round t is given by v(t)S⊤X , where
SX = (R,S, T, P ), (8)
the expected per-round payoff to player X in the repeated game is given by
πX = (1− w)
∞∑
t=0
wtv(t)S⊤X . (9)
The transition-probability matrix for v(t) is given by
M =


pCCqCC pCC(1− qCC) (1− pCC)qCC (1− pCC)(1− qCC)
pCDqDC pCD(1− qDC) (1− pCD)qDC (1− pCD)(1− qDC)
pDCqCD pDC(1− qCD) (1− pDC)qCD (1− pDC)(1− qCD)
pDDqDD pDD(1− qDD) (1− pDD)qDD (1− pDD)(1− qDD)

 . (10)
By substituting
v(t) = v(0)M t (11)
in Eq. (9), one obtains
πX =(1− w)v(0)
∞∑
t=0
(wM)tS⊤X
=(1− w)v(0)(I − wM)−1S⊤X , (12)
where I is the 4× 4 identity matrix. Similarly, the expected per-round payoff to player Y is given by
πY = (1− w)v(0)(I − wM)
−1S⊤Y , (13)
where
SY = (R, T, S, P ). (14)
3 Results
We search player X ’s strategies that impose a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs, i.e.,
απX + βπY + γ = 0. (15)
When α 6= 0, we set χ = −β/α and κ = −γ/(α+ β) to transform Eq. (15) to
πX − κ = χ(πY − κ). (16)
3.1 Equalizer
3.1.1 Expression
By definition, the equalizer unilaterally sets the co-player’s payoff, πY , to a constant value irrespectively of
the co-player’s strategy [2, 9, 10]. To derive an expression for the equalizer strategies in the finitely repeated
game, we proceed along the following idea: If a strategy p ensures that the payoffs of the two players are
on a horizontal line in the πX -πY space, irrespective of the co-player’s strategy, then the payoffs must be on
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that horizontal line if the co-player uses unconditional cooperation or unconditional defection. Substituting
the co-player’s unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection into the payoff formulas gives necessary
conditions imposed on X ’s strategy. A straightforward computation then shows that these necessary conditions
are in fact often sufficient; even if the co-player uses strategies that are not unconditional cooperation or
defection, the two payoffs lie on the same line. We will use the same idea in section 3.2 as well.
Because the equalizer is equivalent to α = 0 in Eq. (15) and hence not covered by Eq. (16), we start by
rewriting Eq. (13) as follows:
πY =(1 − w)v(0)u
eq
=(1 − w) (p0q0, p0(1− q0), (1− p0)q0, (1− p0)(1− q0))


ueq1
ueq2
ueq3
ueq4


=(1 − w) [p0q0u
eq
1 + p0(1 − q0)u
eq
2 + (1− p0)q0u
eq
3 + (1− p0)(1− q0)u
eq
4 ] , (17)
where
ueq =


ueq1
ueq2
ueq3
ueq4

 ≡ (I − wM)−1S⊤Y . (18)
We denote ueq when Y ’s strategy is q = (0, 0, 0, 0) by ueq,0000. Note that ueq,0000 is independent of the
probability that Y cooperates in the initial round, i.e., q0. We denote by πY,0000 the payoff of Y when q =
(0, 0, 0, 0). Similarly, we denote ueq when Y ’s strategy is q = (1, 1, 1, 1) by ueq,1111 and by πY,1111 the payoff of
Y when q = (1, 1, 1, 1). The expressions of ueq,0000, πY,0000, u
eq,1111, and πY,1111 are given in Appendix A. If
X applies an equalizer strategy, πY,0000 = πY,1111 must hold true regardless of q0. Therefore, we obtain
(1− w)
[
p0q0u
eq,0000
1 + p0(1 − q0)u
eq,0000
2 + (1− p0)q0u
eq,0000
3 + (1 − p0)(1− q0)u
eq,0000
4
]
=(1− w)
[
p0q0u
eq,1111
1 + p0(1 − q0)u
eq,1111
2 + (1− p0)q0u
eq,1111
3 + (1 − p0)(1− q0)u
eq,1111
4
]
, (19)
which leads to
q0
[
p0(u
eq,0000
1 − u
eq,1111
1 )− p0(u
eq,0000
2 − u
eq,1111
2 ) + (1− p0)(u
eq,0000
3 − u
eq,1111
3 )− (1− p0)(u
eq,0000
4 − u
eq,1111
4 )
]
+
[
p0(u
eq,0000
2 − u
eq,1111
2 ) + (1− p0)(u
eq,0000
4 − u
eq,1111
4 )
]
= 0. (20)
Equation (20) must hold true for arbitrary 0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1. Therefore, we obtain
p0(u
eq,0000
1 − u
eq,1111
1 ) + (1− p0)(u
eq,0000
3 − u
eq,1111
3 ) =0, (21)
p0(u
eq,0000
2 − u
eq,1111
2 ) + (1− p0)(u
eq,0000
4 − u
eq,1111
4 ) =0. (22)
Combination of Eqs. (18), (21) and (22) leads to the following necessary conditions:
pCD =
pCC(T − P )− (
1
w
+ pDD)(T −R)
R− P
, (23)
pDC =
( 1
w
− pCC)(P − S) + pDD(R − S)
R− P
, (24)
and pCC, pDD, and p0 are arbitrary under the constraint 0 ≤ pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD, p0 ≤ 1. Equations (23) and
(24) extend the results previously obtained for w = 1 [9].
Surprisingly, Eqs. (23) and (24) are also sufficient for p to be an equalizer strategy. In other words, if a
strategy of playerX satisfies Eqs. (23) and (24), then every co-player Y ’s strategy, not restricted to unconditional
cooperation or unconditional defection, yields the same payoff of Y . To verify this, we substitute
p =
(
pCC,
pCC(T − P )− (
1
w
+ pDD)(T −R)
R− P
,
( 1
w
− pCC)(P − S) + pDD(R− S)
R− P
, pDD
)
(25)
and q = (qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD) in Eq. (18) to obtain
ueq =
1
(1− w)(1 − wpCC + wpDD)


w(1 − pCC)P + (1− w + wpDD)R
w(1 − pCC)P + (1− w + wpDD)R
(1− wpCC)P + wpDDR
(1− wpCC)P + wpDDR

 , (26)
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which does not contain q. By substituting Eq. (26) in Eq. (17), we obtain
πY =
(1− p0 + wp0 − wpCC)P + (p0 − wp0 + wpDD)R
1− wpCC + wpDD
, (27)
which is independent of q and q0. Therefore, the set of the equalizer strategies is given by Eq. (25), where
0 ≤ pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD ≤ 1, combined with any 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1.
It should be noted that an equalizer does not require any condition on p0. However, Eq. (27) indicates
that the payoff that an equalizer enforces on the co-player, πY , depends on the value of p0. Because Eq. (27)
is a weighted average of P and R with non-negative weights, an equalizer can impose any payoff value πY
such that P ≤ πY ≤ R. If P is enforced, it holds that p0 − wp0 + wpDD = 0, and hence pDD = p0 = 0.
Therefore, the equalizer is a cautious strategy (i.e., never the first to cooperate) [32]. If R is enforced, it holds
that 1− p0 + wp0 − wpCC = 0, and hence pCC = p0 = 1. Therefore, the equalizer is a nice strategy (i.e., never
the first to detect) [32]. We remark that the equalizer is a ZD strategy for finitely repeated games as defined in
Ref. [32] because it satisfies Eq. (31) of [32] with α = 0.
3.1.2 Minimum discount rate
In this section, we identify the condition for w under which equalizer strategies exist. Equation (25) indicates
that an equalizer strategy exists if and only if
0 ≤ pCC(T − P )−
(
1
w
+ pDD
)
(T −R) ≤ R− P (28)
and
0 ≤
(
1
w
− pCC
)
(P − S) + pDD(R − S) ≤ R− P (29)
for some 0 ≤ pCC, pDD ≤ 1. Note that we used Eq. (2). Independently of w, any pair of pCC and pDD satisfies
the second inequality of Eq. (28) and the first inequality of Eq. (29) because they are satisfied in the most
stringent case, i.e., pCC = 1 and pDD = 0. The first inequality of Eq. (28) and the second inequality of Eq. (29)
read
pDD ≤
T − P
T −R
pCC −
1
w
(30)
and
pDD ≤
P − S
R− S
pCC −
1
w
P − S
R− S
+
R− P
R− S
, (31)
respectively. Equations (30) and (31) specify a pCC-pDD region in the square 0 ≤ pCC, pDD ≤ 1, near the corner
(pCC, pDD) = (1, 0) (shaded region in Fig. 1). The feasible set (pCC, pDD) monotonically enlarges as w increases.
Therefore, we obtain the condition under which an equalizer exists by substituting pCC = 1 and pDD = 0 in
Eqs. (30) and (31), i.e.,
w ≥ wc ≡ max
(
T −R
T − P
,
P − S
R− S
)
. (32)
When w = wc, the unique equalizer strategy is given by pCC = 1, pDD = 0, and either pCD or pDC is equal
to zero, depending on whether (T − R)/(T − P ) is larger than (P − S)/(R − S) or vice versa. The condition
w ≥ (T −R)/(T − P ) in Eq. (32) coincides with that for the GRIM or tit-for-tat strategy to be stable against
the unconditional defector [5].
Equation (32) is consistent with the result for the continuous donation game [27]. Their result adapted to
the case of two discrete levels of cooperation is wc = c/b, where b and c are the usual benefit and cost parameters
in the donation game, respectively. We verify that Eq. (32) with R = b − c, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0 yields
wc = c/b.
3.2 General cases
All strategies but the equalizer in which a linear relationship is imposed between πX and πY are given in the
form of Eq. (16). In this section, we derive expressions of X ’s strategy that realizes Eq. (16).
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1
pCC
1
pDD
0
Figure 1: Region in the pCC–pDD space where the equalizer strategy exists (shaded region). The border line
of the half plane specified by Eqs. (30) and (31) are shown by the solid and dashed lines, respectively. We set
R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, P = 1, and w = 0.8.
By substituting Eqs. (12) and (13) in Eq. (16), we obtain
(1− w)v(0)(I − wM)−1S⊤X − κ = χ
[
(1 − w)v(0)(I − wM)−1S⊤Y − κ
]
. (33)
Equation (33) yields
v(0)
{
(1− w)(I − wM)−1
[
S⊤X − χS
⊤
Y
]
+ (χ− 1)κ1
}
= 0, (34)
where
1 =


1
1
1
1

 . (35)
We set
uzd =


uzd1
uzd2
uzd3
uzd4

 ≡ (1 − w)(I − wM)−1 [S⊤X − χS⊤Y ]+ (χ− 1)κ1. (36)
Then, Eq. (34) is rewritten as
v(0)uzd = 0, (37)
which is equivalent to
q0
[
p0u
zd
1 − p0u
zd
2 + (1− p0)u
zd
3 − (1− p0)u
zd
4
]
+
[
p0u
zd
2 + (1− p0)u
zd
4
]
= 0. (38)
Because Eq. (38) must hold true irrespectively of q0, we require
p0u
zd
1 + (1− p0)u
zd
3 =0, (39)
p0u
zd
2 + (1− p0)u
zd
4 =0. (40)
Let us denote by uzd,0000 and uzd,1111 the vector u when q = (0, 0, 0, 0) and q = (1, 1, 1, 1), respectively. The
expressions of uzd,0000 and uzd,1111 are given in Appendix B. By substituting uzd,0000 and uzd,1111 in Eqs. (39)
and (40), we obtain the four necessary conditions, Eqs. (91), (92), (93), and (94), given in Appendix B.
If we assume κ− S + χ(T − κ) 6= 0, we can rewrite Eq. (92) as
pDD =
(1 − w)p0 [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] + (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)(κ− P )
w [κ− S + χ(T − κ)]
. (41)
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If we assume T − κ+ χ(κ− S) 6= 0, we can rewrite Eq. (93) as
pCC =
− (1 − w)p0 [(χ− 1)R+ T − χS] + T − χS + (1 + wpDC)(χ− 1)κ− wpDC(χ− 1)R
w [T − κ+ χ(κ− S)]
. (42)
We will deal with the case κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0 later in this section.
By substituting Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eqs. (91), we obtain an equation containing pCD, pDC, p0, κ, and χ as
unknowns. This equation can be factorized. By equating each of the two factors with 0, we obtain two types of
solutions. The one type of solution is given by
p =


(1 − w)p0 [(χ− 1)R+ S − χT ]− (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)R+ χT − S − wpCD(χ− 1)κ
w [κ− S + χ(T − κ)]
pCD
− (1− w)p0(χ+ 1)(T − S) + (1− wpCD) [(χ− 1)κ+ T − χS]
w [κ− S + χ(T − κ)]
(1 − w)p0 [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] + (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)(κ− P )
w [κ− S + χ(T − κ)]


. (43)
Equation (43) also satisfies Eq. (94). To verify that Eq. (43) is sufficient, we substitute Eq. (43) in Eq. (36) to
obtain
uzd =
(1 − w) [S + (χ− 1)κ− χT ]
1− wpCD − (1− w)p0


1− p0
1− p0
−p0
−p0

 , (44)
which does not contain q. Using Eqs. (7) and (44), we verify Eq. (37). Therefore, Eq. (43) is a set of strategies
that impose the linear relationship between the payoff of the two players, i.e., Eq. (16).
The strategies given by Eq. (43) are ZD strategies for w < 1 as defined in Ref. [32], which is verified as
follows. Assume that α 6= 0 in Eq. (31) of [32] because α = 0 corresponds to the equalizer. Then, let us
substitute α = φ, β = −φχ, and γ = φ(χ − 1)κ in Eq. (31) of [32] without loss of generality. Note that this
transformation is a bijection because (i) φ > 0 and (ii) either χ > 1 or χ < 0 is required (in the notation of
Ref. [32], φ > 0 and χ < 1 because their χ is defined as the reciprocal of our χ). Then, we obtain
wp =


1− φ(χ − 1)(R− κ)− (1 − w)p0
1 + φ [(χ− 1)κ− χT + S]− (1− w)p0
φ [(χ− 1)κ+ T − χS]− (1 − w)p0
φ(χ− 1)(κ− P )− (1 − w)p0


, (45)
which is equivalent to Eq. (33) of [32]. Equation (45) combined with
φ =
1− wpCD − p0(1− w)
κ− S + χ(T − κ)
(46)
is equivalent to Eq. (43). It should also be noted that Eq. (45) extends Eq. (9) of [16], which has been obtained
for w = 1, to general w, R, and P values.
The other type of solution that we obtain by substituting Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (91) is given by
p0[T −R+ χ(R − S)] = T − κ+ χ(κ− S). (47)
Substitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (94) yields either Eq. (43) or
p0[P − S + χ(T − P )] = (χ− 1)(κ− P ). (48)
The combination of Eqs. (47) and (48) is equivalent to that of
κ = p20R+ p0(1− p0)(T + S) + (1− p0)
2P (49)
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and
χ = −
(1− p0)(T − P ) + p0(R− S)
(1− p0)(P − S) + p0(T −R)
. (50)
However, Eqs. (41), (42), (49), and (50) do not provide a sufficient condition for Eq. (37) to hold true for
arbitrary q and q0. Therefore, we additionally consider the vector u
zd when q = (1, 0, 0, 0) and q = (0, 0, 0, 1),
which we denote by uzd,1000 and uzd,0001, respectively. The calculations shown in Appendix C lead to
p0 = pCC = pCD = pDC = pDD (0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1). (51)
To verify that the unconditional strategies given by Eq. (51) are a sufficient condition for Eq. (16) to hold
true for arbitrary q and q0, we substitute Eqs. (49), (50), and (51) in Eq. (36) to obtain
uzd =
(1− w)(T − S)
−(1− p0)P + S + p0(R− S − T )


−(1− p0)[−(1− p0)P + (1 + p0)R − p0(T + S)]
−(1− p0)[−(2− p0)P + T + S + p0(R− S − T )]
p0[−(1− p0)P + (1 + p0)R − p0(T + S)]
p0[−(2− p0)P + T + S + p0(R − S − T )]

 , (52)
which does not contain q. Using Eqs. (7) and (52), we verify Eq. (37). The unconditional strategy given by
Eq. (51) is not a ZD strategy in the sense of [32] unless R + P = T + S (Appendix D), which is the same
condition as that for the infinitely repeated game [15].
The obtained solution, i.e., Eq. (51) combined with Eqs. (49) and (50), is equivalent to the previously derived
solution for w = 1 [15]. This set of solutions contains the unconditional cooperator and unconditional defector
as special cases, and always realizes χ < 0 (Eq. (50)).
When κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0, the calculations shown in Appendices E and F reveal
the following three types of solutions: (i) a subset of the ZD strategies given by Eq. (43) (Appendix F.2), (ii) a
subset of the strategies given by Eq. (51) (Appendices E.1, E.2, and F.2), and (iii) the set of strategies given by
p =
(
pCC, 1,
wpCC(χ+ 1)(κ− T )− w[R − (χ+ 1)T + χκ]− (κ−R)
w(κ− R)
,
wpCC(κ− P )− w(R − P )− (κ−R)
w(κ−R)
)
, p0 = 1,
(53)
where 0 ≤ pCC ≤ 1 and κ 6= R (Appendix E.2). Although Eq. (53) is a sufficient condition and the resulting
solutions are distinct from those given by Eq. (43), in fact Eq. (53) yields χ < 0 (Appendix E.2).
To summarize, the set of X ’s strategies that enforce Eq. (16) is the union of the strategies given by the ZD
strategies, Eq. (43), and the non-ZD unconditional strategies, Eq. (51). In the next sections, we examine two
special cases, which have been studied in the literature, and derive wc in each case.
3.3 Extortioner
3.3.1 Expression
The extortioner is defined as a strategy that enforces an extortionate share of payoffs larger than P [9]. We
obtain the extortioner by setting κ = P in Eq. (16). By setting κ = P in Eq. (43), we obtain
p =


(1− w)p0 [(χ− 1)R+ S − χT ]− (1 − wpCD)(χ− 1)R+ χT − S − wpCD(χ− 1)P
w [P − S + χ(T − P )]
pCD
− (1− w)p0(χ+ 1)(T − S) + (1− wpCD) [(χ− 1)P + T − χS]
w [P − S + χ(T − P )]
−
(1− w)p0
w


. (54)
Because pDD = −(1 − w)p0/w ≥ 0 and w < 1, we obtain p0 = 0 and pDD = 0, which is consistent with the
previously obtained result [32]. Therefore, the extortioner is never the first to cooperate and hence a so-called
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cautious strategy [32]. By setting p0 = 0 in Eq. (54), we obtain
p =


− wpCD(χ− 1)P − (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)R− S + χT
w [P − S + χ(T − P )]
pCD
(1 − wpCD) [(χ− 1)P + T − χS]
w [P − S + χ(T − P )]
0


. (55)
3.3.2 Minimum discount rate
By setting κ = P and p0 = 0 in Eq. (45), we obtain
wp =


1− φ(χ− 1)(R− P )
1 + φ [(χ− 1)P − χT + S]
φ [(χ− 1)P + T − χS]
0


. (56)
Because pCC ≤ 1 and w < 1, Eq. (56) implies that φ(χ−1) > 0 must hold true. We consider the case φ > 0 and
χ > 1 in this section. We can exclude the case φ < 0 and χ < 1 because a strategy with χ < 0 is not considered
as an extortionate strategy [9, 14–16,22, 24, 27, 28, 32, 35] and χ < 1 implies χ < 0 (Appendix G.1).
When φ > 0, the application of 0 ≤ pCC, pCD, pDC ≤ 1 to Eq. (56) yields
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
≤
1
φ
≤
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (57)
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
≤
1
φ
≤
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (58)
χ+
T − P
P − S
≤
1
φ
. (59)
The condition under which a positive φ value that satisfies Eqs. (57), (58), and (59) exists is given by
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
≤
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (60)
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
≤
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (61)
χ+
T − P
P − S
≤
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (62)
χ+
T − P
P − S
≤
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
. (63)
Equation (60) is always satisfied. Equations (61), (62), and (63) yield
χ [w(T − P )− (T −R)] ≥R− S − w(P − S), (64)
χ [w(T − S)− (P − S)] ≥T − P − w(T − S), (65)
χ [w(R − S)− (P − S)] ≥T − P − w(T −R), (66)
respectively.
The left-hand side of Eq. (65) is always larger than that of Eq. (66), and the right-hand side of Eq. (65)
is always smaller than that of Eq. (66). Therefore, Eq. (65) is satisfied if Eq. (66) is satisfied. The right-hand
sides of Eqs. (64) and (66) are positive. Therefore, w(T − P )− (T − R) > 0 and w(T − S) − (P − S) > 0 are
required for χ to be positive. On the other hand, if w(T − P ) − (T − R) > 0 and w(T − S) − (P − S) > 0,
Eqs. (64) and (66) guarantee that χ > 1 and that a χ(> 1) value exists. Therefore, an extortioner with χ > 1
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exists if and only if w > wc, where the wc value coincides with that for the equalizer; it is given by Eq. (32).
Under w > wc, Eqs. (64) and (66) imply
χ ≥ χc(w) ≡ max
(
R − S − w(P − S)
w(T − P )− (T −R)
,
T − P − w(T −R)
w(R − S)− (P − S)
)
. (67)
Equation (67) gives the range of χ values for which the extortioner strategy exists. The conditions for the
existence of an extortionate strategy are easier to satisfy for large w in the sense that χc(w) monotonically
decreases as w increases. In particular, we obtain limw→wc+0 χc(w) =∞ and limw→1 χc(w) = 1.
For a given χ value, the substitution of R = b− c, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0 in Eqs. (32) yields
wc =
χc+ b
χb+ c
, (68)
which is consistent with Eq. (7) of [27].
3.4 Generous strategy
3.4.1 Expression
The generous strategy, also called compliers, is defined as a strategy that yields a larger shortfall from the
mutual cooperation payoff R for the player as compared to that for the co-player [11, 15, 35]. We obtain the
generous strategy by setting κ = R in Eq. (16). By setting κ = R in Eq. (43), we obtain
p =


1− p0(1− w)
w
pCD
− (1− w)p0(χ+ 1)(T − S) + (1− wpCD) [(χ− 1)R+ T − χS]
w [R− S + χ(T −R)]
(1− w)p0 [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] + (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)(R − P )
w [R− S + χ(T −R)]


. (69)
Because pCC = [1− (1− w)p0] /w ≤ 1, we obtain p0 = 1 and pCC = 1, which is consistent with the previously
obtained result [32]. Therefore, the generous strategy is never the first to detect and hence a so-called nice
strategy [5, 32]. By setting p0 = 1 in Eq. (69), we obtain
p =


1
pCD
− (1− w)(χ+ 1)(T − S) + (1− wpCD) [(χ− 1)R+ T − χS]
w [R− S + χ(T −R)]
(1− w) [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] + (1 − wpCD)(χ− 1)(R− P )
w [R− S + χ(T −R)]


=


1
pCD
1− 1
w
+ (1−pCD)[(χ−1)R+T−χS]
R−S+χ(T−R)
1− 1
w
+ (1−pCD)(χ−1)(R−P )
R−S+χ(T−R)


. (70)
3.4.2 Minimum discount rate
By applying 0 ≤ pDC, pDD ≤ 1 to Eq. (70), we obtain
1
w
− 1 ≤ (1 − pCD)g1 ≤
1
w
, (71)
1
w
− 1 ≤ (1 − pCD)g2 ≤
1
w
, (72)
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Figure 2: Region in the g1–g2 space where the generous strategy exists (shaded region). If (g1, g2) is located in
this region (e.g., filled circle labeled pCD = 0), the square given by 1/w − 1 ≤ g1, g2 ≤ 1/w intersects the line
segment connecting the assumed (g1, g2) and the origin. Note that any point on the line segment is realized by
the solution by a value of pCD (Eqs. (71) and (72)).
where
g1 ≡
(χ− 1)R+ T − χS
R− S + χ(T −R)
, (73)
g2 ≡
(χ− 1)(R− P )
R− S + χ(T −R)
. (74)
The necessary and sufficient condition for 0 ≤ pCD ≤ 1 that satisfies Eqs. (71) and (72) to exist is given by
(Fig. 2)
g1 ≥
1
w
− 1, (75)
g2 ≥
1
w
− 1, (76)
1− w ≤
g2
g1
≤
1
1− w
. (77)
In the remainder of this section, we assume χ ≥ 0, which a generous strategy requires [15, 16, 27, 28, 32, 35],
and examine the conditions given by Eqs. (75), (76), and (77). For mathematical interests, the analysis of the
minimum discount rate for χ < 0 is presented in Appendix G.2. First, because dg1/dχ > 0, which one can
derive using Eq. (3), and g1 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (75) is equivalent to
χ ≥
R− S − w(T − S)
−(T −R) + w(T − S)
(78)
and
w >
T −R
T − S
. (79)
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When w ≤ (T−R)/(T−S), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (75) does not exist. Second, because dg2/dχ > 0
and g2 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (76) is equivalent to
χ ≥
R− S − w(P − S)
−(T −R) + w(T − P )
(80)
and
w >
T −R
T − P
. (81)
When w ≤ (T − R)/(T − P ), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (76) does not exist. Third, because
d(g2/g1)/dχ > 0 and g2/g1 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (77) is equivalent to
χ ≥
T − P − w(T −R)
−(P − S) + w(R − S)
(82)
and
w >
P − S
R− S
. (83)
When w ≤ (P − S)/(R− S), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (77) does not exist.
By combining Eqs. (79), (81), and (83), we find that a generous strategy exists if and only if w > wc, where
wc is given by Eq. (32). Therefore, the threshold w value above which a ZD strategy exists is the same for the
equalizer, extortioner, and generous strategy. It should be noted that w = wc is allowed for the equalizer, but
not for the extortioner and the generous strategy. When w > wc, Eq. (80) implies Eq. (78), and hence one
obtains
χ ≥ χc(w) ≡ max
(
R− S − w(P − S)
−(T −R) + w(T − P )
,
T − P − w(T −R)
−(P − S) + w(R − S)
)
. (84)
Note that χc(w) > 1 and χc(w) decreases as w(> wc) increases. Equation (84) implies that limw→wc+0 χc(w) =
∞ and limw→1 χc(w) = 1, which are the same asymptotic as the case of the extortioner.
4 Conclusions
We analyzed ZD strategies in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with general payoff matrices. Apart
from the derivation of convenient expressions for ZD strategies, the novel results derived in the present article
are two-fold. First, we derived the threshold discount factor value, wc, above which the ZD strategies exist for
three commonly studied classes of ZD strategies, i.e., equalizer, extortioner, and generous strategies. They all
share the same threshold value. Similar to the case of the condition for mutual cooperation in direct reciprocity,
ZD strategies can exist only when there are sufficiently many rounds. Second, we showed that the memory-
one strategies that impose a linear relationship between the payoff of the two players are either ZD strategies
(Eqs. (43) and (53)) or an unconditional strategy (Eq. (51)). The latter class includes the unconditional
cooperator and unconditional defector as special cases. Therefore, for finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
games (i.e., w < 1), we answered affirmatively to the conjecture posed in [15]. With a continuity argument, our
results also cover the infinite case, by the consideration of the limit w → 1. In other words, if the two payoffs
are in a linear relationship for any w = 1 − ǫ, where ǫ ≪ 1, then the payoffs are also on a line as ǫ goes to 0.
For a similar argument, see Eqs. (5) and (6) in Ref. [32]. The present results also hold true when the co-player
employs a longer-memory strategy, because it is straightforward to apply the proof for the infinite case [9] to
the finite case.
Our analytical approach is different from the previous approaches. Press and Dyson’s derivation is based
on the linear algebra of matrices [9]. The proof in Ref. [14] considers certain telescoping sums. The approach
considered in the present study is more elementary than theirs, i.e., to derive necessary conditions and show
that they are sufficient by straightforward calculations.
We mention possible directions of future research. First, we conjecture that the wc value is the same for all
ZD strategies because it takes the same value for the three common ZD strategies. Second, the explicit forms
of our solutions (Eqs. (25) and (43)) may be useful for exploring features of ZD strategies in finitely repeated
games. For example, investigation of evolutionary dynamics and extensions to multiplayer games, which have
been examined for infinitely repeated games (see section 1 for references), in the case of finitely repeated games
may benefit from the present results.
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Appendix A Expression of ueq,0000, piY,0000, u
eq,1111, and piY,1111
By substituting q = (0, 0, 0, 0) in Eq. (10) and then substituting the obtained M in Eq. (18), we obtain
ueq,0000 =
1
(1 − w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)
×

(1− w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)R+ w(1 − pCC + wpCC − wpCD)P + w(pCC − wpCC + wpDD)T
w(1 − pCD)P + (1 − w + wpDD)T
(1− w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)S + w(1 − pDC − wpCD + wpDC)P + w(pDC − wpDC + wpDD)T
(1− wpCD)P + wpDDT

 ,
(85)
which leads to
πY,0000 = (1− w)v(0)u
eq,0000. (86)
Similarly, by substituting q = (1, 1, 1, 1) in Eq. (10) and then substituting the obtained M in Eq. (18), we
obtain
ueq,1111 =
1
(1 − w)(1 − wpCC + wpDC)
×

w(1 − pCC)S + (1− w + wpDC)R
(1− w)(1 − wpCC + wpDC)T + w(1 − pCD − wpCC + wpCD)S + w(pCD − wpCD + wpDC)R
(1 − wpCC)S + wpDCR
(1− w)(1 − wpCC + wpDC)P + w(1 − pDD − wpCC + wpDD)S + w(pDD + wpDC − wpDD)R

 ,
(87)
which leads to
πY,1111 = (1− w)v(0)u
eq,1111. (88)
Appendix B Expression of uzd,0000 and uzd,1111, and four necessary
conditions in section 3.2
By substituting q = (0, 0, 0, 0) in Eq. (10) and then substituting the obtained M in Eq. (36), we obtain
uzd,0000 =


− w(1 − pCC + wpCC − wpCD)(χ− 1)P + w(pCC − wpCC + wpDD)(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ− (1− w)(χ− 1)R
− w(1 − pCD)(χ− 1)P + (1− w + wpDD)(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ
− w(1 − pDC − wpCD + wpDC)(χ− 1)P + w(pDC − wpDC + wpDD)(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ+ (1 − w)(T − χS)
− (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)P + wpDD(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ


.
(89)
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By substituting q = (1, 1, 1, 1) in Eq. (10) and then substituting the obtained M in Eq. (36), we obtain
uzd,1111 =


w(1 − pCC)(T − χS)− (1 − w + wpDC)(χ− 1)R
1− wpCC + wpDC
+ (χ− 1)κ
w(1 − pCD − wpCC + wpCD)(T − χS)− w(pCD − wpCD + wpDC)(χ− 1)R
1− wpCC + wpDC
+ (χ− 1)κ+ (1− w)(S − χT )
(1− wpCC)(T − χS)− wpDC(χ− 1)R
1− wpCC + wpDC
+ (χ− 1)κ
w(1 − pDD − wpCC + wpDD)(T − χS)− w(pDD + wpDC − wpDD)(χ− 1)R
1− wpCC + wpDC
+ (χ− 1)κ− (1− w)(χ − 1)P


.
(90)
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eqs. (89) and (90) is positive.
By substituting Eq. (89) in Eq. (39), we obtain
(1− w)p0 {(1− wpCD + wpDD) [−(χ− 1)R− T + χS] + w(pCC − pDC) [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ]}
+(1− wpCD + wpDD) [(χ− 1)κ+ (1− w)(T − χS)] + w[−(1 − pDC − wpCD + wpDC)(χ− 1)P
+(pDC − wpDC + wpDD)(S − χT )] = 0. (91)
By substituting Eq. (89) in Eq. (40), we obtain
(1− w)p0 [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ]− (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)P + wpDD(S − χT )
+(1− wpCD + wpDD)(χ− 1)κ = 0. (92)
By substituting Eq. (90) in Eq. (39), we obtain
(1− w)p0 [−(χ− 1)R− T + χS]
+(1− wpCC)(T − χS)− wpDC(χ− 1)R+ (1 − wpCC + wpDC)(χ− 1)κ = 0. (93)
By substituting Eq. (90) in Eq. (40), we obtain
(1− w)p0 {(1 − wpCC + wpDC) [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] + w(pCD − pDD) [−(χ− 1)R− T + χS]}
+(1− wpCC + wpDC)(χ− 1) [κ− (1 − w)P ] + w[(1 − pDD − wpCC + wpDD)(T − χS)
−(pDD + wpDC − wpDD)(χ− 1)R] = 0. (94)
Appendix C Derivation of Eq. (51)
In this section, we derive Eq. (51) from Eqs. (49) and (50).
We obtain
uzd,1000 =


1
(1 − wpCC)(1− wpCD + wpDD)
×
{{
−(1− w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)R− w
2(1− pCC)[1− (1 − w)pDC − wpCD]P
}
(χ− 1)
+w(1− pCC) {(1− w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)(T − χS) + w[(1− w)pDC + wpDD](S − χT )}}+ (χ− 1)κ
− w(1 − pCD)(χ− 1)P + (1− w + wpDD)(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ
− w(1 − pDC − wpCD + wpDC)(χ− 1)P + w(pDC − wpDC + wpDD)(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ+ (1 − w)(T − χS)
− (1− wpCD)(χ− 1)P + wpDD(S − χT )
1− wpCD + wpDD
+ (χ− 1)κ


.
(95)
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Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (95) is positive. By substituting Eq. (95) in Eq. (40),
we obtain Eq. (92). By substituting Eq. (95) in Eq. (39), we obtain
p0(1− w) {{−(1− wpCD + wpDD)R+ w[1 − (1− w)pDC − wpCD]P} (χ− 1)
−(1− w)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)(T − χS)− w[(1 − w)pDC + wpDD](S − χT )}
+(1− wpCC) {−w[1− (1 − w)pDC − wpCD](χ− 1)P + w[(1 − w)pDC + wpDD](S − χT )}
+(1− wpCC)(1 − wpCD + wpDD)(χ− 1)κ+ (1− wpCC)(1− wpCD + wpDD)(1 − w)(T − χS) = 0. (96)
Substitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (96) yields either the third entry of Eq. (43) or
(p0 − pDC)(κ−R)(1− w)w(χ − 1) [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ]
[T − κ+ χ(κ− S)] [κ− S + χ(T − κ)]
= 0. (97)
The case in which the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (97) is equal to 0 is covered in Appendices E
and F. We note that χ 6= 1 because χ = 1 substituted in Eq. (50) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2). By
combining this observation with 0 < w < 1, we obtain
(p0 − pDC)(κ−R) [(χ− 1)P + S − χT ] = 0. (98)
By substituting Eqs. (49) and (50) in Eq. (98), we obtain the following four possible cases: p0 = pDC, p0 = 1,
p0 = (R − P )/(T + S −R− P ), and p0 = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S −R − P ).
First, assume that p0 = pDC. By substituting p0 = pDC and Eq. (47) in Eq. (93), we obtain (pCC −
pDC) [T − κ+ χ(κ− S)] = 0. Because we have excluded the case T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0, which we deal with in
Appendix E, we obtain pCC = pDC. Therefore, we obtain
p0 = pCC = pDC. (99)
Second, assume that p0 = 1. Substitution of p0 = 1 in Eq. (49) yields κ = R. Substitution of p0 = 1 and
κ = R in Eq. (42) yields pCC = 1. Substitution of p0 = 1 in Eq. (50) yields χ = −(R−S)/(T −R). Substitution
of p0 = 1, χ = −(R − S)/(T − R), and κ = R in Eq. (92) yields (1 − pCD)(T − S)(R − P ) = 0, which implies
pCD = 1. Therefore, p0 = 1 combined with Eqs. (49) and (50) results in
p0 = pCC = pCD = 1. (100)
Third, we note that
p0 6=
R− P
T + S − R− P
(101)
because combination of p0 = (R − P )/(T + S − R − P ) and 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1 leads to T + S − R − P > 0 and
2R ≤ T + S, and the latter inequality contradicts Eq. (3).
Fourth, assume that p0 = (T+S−2P )/(T+S−R−P ). By substituting p0 = (T+S−2P )/(T+S−R−P ) in
Eqs. (49) and (50), we obtain χ = −(P−S)/(T−P ) and κ = P , respectively. Then, we obtain κ−S+χ(T−κ) =
0, which we have decided to deal with later.
To summarize, Eq. (98) leads to either Eq. (99) or (100).
We obtain
uzd,0001 =(χ− 1)κ


1
1
1
1

+ 1(1 + w)(1 − wpCD) + w2 [pDC(1− pDD) + pCCpDD)]×


{[
−1 + wpCD + w
2(1− pDC)(1 − pDD)− w
3(pCD − pDC)(1− pDD)
]
R
+w[−1 + (1− w)pCC + wpCD]P} (χ− 1) + w {w(1 − pDD)[(1− wpCD)− (1− w)pCC](T − χS)
+[pCC − w
2(1− pDD)(pCC − pDC)](S − χT )
}
w(1 − pCD)[−(P + wpDDR)(χ− 1) + w(1 − pDD)(T − χS)]
+[1− w2(1− pDC − pCCpDD + pDCpDD)](S − χT )
w [−1 + wpCD + (1− w)pDC] (P + wpDDR)(χ− 1)
+
{
1− w2pDD[1− (1− w)pCC]− wpCD(1− w
2pDD)
}
(T − χS) + w[pDC + w
2(pCC − pDC)pDD](S − χT )
− [(1− wpCD)P + wpDD(1− wpCD)R] (χ− 1) + w {(1− pDD)(1− wpCD)(T − χS)
+w(pDC + pCCpDD − pDCpDD)(S − χT )}


.
(102)
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Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (102) is positive. By substituting Eq. (102) in Eq. (40),
we obtain
(1− w)p0 {(P + wpDDR)(χ− 1)− w(1 − pDD)(T − χS) + (1 + w)(S − χT )} − [(1− wpCD)P
+wpDD(1 − wpCD)R](χ− 1) + w {(1− pDD)(1− wpCD)(T − χS) + w[pDC + pDD(pCC − pDC)](S − χT )}
+
{
1 + w(1 − pCD)− w
2[pCD − pDC − pDD(pCC − pDC)]
}
(χ− 1)κ = 0.
(103)
Substitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (103) yields either the third entry of Eq. (43) or
1
[T − κ+ χ(κ− S)][κ− S + χ(T − κ)]
×
{
w(χ− 1)2κ2 − [1− (1− w)p0 − wpCD](χ− 1)[T −R+ χ(R− S)]P
+ {w(T − χS) + (1− w)p0[T −R + χ(R− S)]} (S − χT )− {−(1− wpCD)(χ− 1)R
−[1 + w(1 − pCD − χ)]T + [χ− w(1 − χ+ pCDχ)]S} (χ− 1)κ} = 0.
(104)
We examine the case in which the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (104) is zero in Appendices E and
F. Therefore, we ignore the denominator and substitute Eqs. (49) and (50) in Eq. (104) to obtain p0 = pCD,
p0 = 0, p0 = (R − P )/(T + S − R − P ), or p0 = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ). Among these four possible
options, we have excluded p0 = (R−P )/(T +S−R−P ) and p0 = (T +S− 2P )/(T +S−R−P ) in the course
of the analysis of uzd,1000.
First, assume that p0 = pCD. By substituting p0 = pCD and Eq. (48) in Eq. (92), we obtain (pCD −
pDD) [κ− S + χ(T − κ)] = 0. Because we have excluded the case κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0, which we deal with in
Appendix E, we obtain pDD = pCD. Therefore, we obtain
p0 = pCD = pDD. (105)
Second, assume that p0 = 0. Substitution of p0 = 0 in Eq. (49) yields κ = P . Substitution of p0 = 0 and
κ = P in Eq. (41) yields pDD = 0. Substitution of p0 = 0 in Eq. (50) yields χ = −(T −P )/(P −S). Substitution
of p0 = 0, χ = −(T − P )/(P − S), and κ = P in Eq. (93) yields wpDC(R − P ) = 0, which implies pDC = 0.
Therefore, p0 = 0 combined with Eqs. (49) and (50) results in
p0 = pDC = pDD = 0. (106)
A solution must simultaneously satisfy either Eq. (99) or (100), and either Eq. (105) or (106). The combi-
nation of Eqs. (99) and (105) provides the set of unconditional strategies, i.e., Eq. (51). The combination of
Eqs. (99) and (106) provides a subset of the strategies given by Eq. (51). The combination of Eqs. (100) and
(105) also provides a subset of the strategies given by Eq. (51). Equations (100) and (106) are inconsistent with
each other. Therefore, the set of solutions is given by Eq. (51).
Appendix D An unconditional strategy is not a ZD strategy unless
R+ P = T + S
In this section, we show that the unconditional strategy given by Eq. (51) is not a ZD strategy in the sense
of [32] if R+ P 6= T + S.
By substituting pDC = pDD in Eq. (45), we obtain
φ [(χ− 1)κ+ T − χS]− (1− w)p0
w
=
φ(χ− 1)(κ− P )− (1− w)p0
w
, (107)
which leads to
φ[(χ− 1)κ+ T − χS] = φ(χ− 1)(κ− P ).
If φ = 0, we substitute φ = 0 in the expression of pDD in Eq. (45) to obtain pDD = −(1−w)p0/w. This equation
holds true if and only if p0 = pDD = 0. Next, we substitute φ = 0 in the expression of pCC in Eq. (45) to obtain
pCC = [1− (1− w)p0] /w. This equation holds true if and only if p0 = pCC = 1, which contradicts p0 = 0.
Therefore, we obtain φ 6= 0. Given φ 6= 0, Eq. (107) implies
χ = −
T − P
P − S
. (108)
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By setting pCC = pCD in Eq. (45) and using φ 6= 0, we obtain
χ = −
R− S
T −R
. (109)
By combining Eqs. (108) and (109), we obtain
R+ P = T + S. (110)
Equation (110) is a sufficient condition for the unconditional strategy to be a ZD because substitution of
Eqs. (49), (50), (110) and
φ = −
T −R
(T − S)(R − P )
(111)
in Eq. (45) yields Eq. (51).
Appendix E Case κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0
In this section, we assume
κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 (112)
and derive the set of strategies that satisfy Eq. (16).
By substituting Eq. (112) in Eq. (92), we obtain
(χ− 1)(κ− P ) [(1− w)p0 − 1 + wpCD] = 0. (113)
Equation (112) does not allow χ = 1 because substitution of χ = 1 in Eq. (112) yields T = S, which contradicts
Eq. (2). Substitution of κ = P in Eq. (112) yields χ = −(P − S)/(T − P ). Alternatively, if we set (1− w)p0 −
1 + wpCD = 0, we obtain p0 = pCD = 1. Therefore, we consider the following two subcases, i.e., subcase (A)
specified by
κ = P (114)
and
χ = −
P − S
T − P
, (115)
and subcase (B) specified by
κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 (116)
and
p0 = pCD = 1. (117)
E.1 Subcase (A): κ = P and χ = −(P − S)/(T − P )
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (91), we obtain
(1 − w)[1 − w(pCD − pDD)][−p0(T + S −R− P ) + T + S − 2P ](T − S)
T − P
= 0. (118)
Because T > P > S, 0 < w < 1, and there exists no pair of pCD and pDD (0 ≤ pCD, pDD ≤ 1) that satisfies
pCD − pDD = 1/w, we obtain
p0(T + S −R − P ) = T + S − 2P. (119)
If we set T + S − R − P = 0, we obtain T + S − 2P = R − P > 0, which contradicts Eq. (119). Therefore,
Eq. (119) leads to T + S −R − P 6= 0, and hence
p0 =
T + S − 2P
T + S −R− P
. (120)
If T + S − R − P > 0, the condition p0 ≤ 1 applied to Eq. (120) yields R ≤ P , which contradicts Eq. (2).
Therefore, we obtain T + S −R− P < 0 and hence T + S − 2P ≤ 0.
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (96), we obtain
(1 − w) [1− w(pCD − pDD)] {p0 [R− (1− w)(T + S)] + (1 − wpCC)(T + S)− [2− (1− 2w)p0 − 2wpCC]P} (T − S)
T − P
= 0.
(121)
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Because 1− w(pCD − pDD) > 0, Eq. (121) implies
p0 [R− (1 − w)(T + S)] + (1− wpCC)(T + S)− [2− (1− 2w)p0 − 2wpCC]P = 0. (122)
Substitution of Eq. (120) in Eq. (122) yields
w [−pCC(T + S −R − P ) + T + S − 2P ] (T + S − 2P )
T + S −R− P
= 0. (123)
We will deal with the case T + S − 2P = 0 later in this section. Therefore, by assuming T + S − 2P < 0, we
obtain
pCC =
T + S − 2P
T + S −R− P
. (124)
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (93), we obtain
{(1− w)p0(R− S − T ) + wpDCR− wpCC(T + S)− [2− (1− w)p0 − 2wpCC + wpDC]P + T + S} (T − S)
T − P
= 0.
(125)
By substituting p0 = pCC = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S −R− P ) in Eq. (125), we obtain
w [−pDC(T + S −R− P ) + T + S − 2P ] (P −R)(T − S)
(T − P )(T + S −R − P )
= 0, (126)
which leads to
pDC =
T + S − 2P
T + S −R− P
. (127)
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (103), we obtain
w [1− wpCD − (1− w)p0] [−pDD(T + S −R− P ) + T + S − 2P ] (T − S)
T − P
= 0. (128)
If 1−wpCD− (1−w)p0 = 0, we obtain p0 = pCD = 1, which contradicts Eq. (120). Therefore, Eq. (128) implies
pDD =
T + S − 2P
T + S −R − P
. (129)
To derive another condition, we use the vector u when player Y adopts the tit-for-tat strategy, i.e., q =
(1, 0, 1, 0). This vector, denoted by uzd,1010, is given by
uzd,1010 =(χ− 1)κ


1
1
1
1

+ 1(1 − wpCC)(1 − w2pDC) + w2pCDpDC(1− w) + w(1 + w)pDD(1− wpCC) + w3pCDpDD×


{
−[1− w(1 − pDD)− w
2pDC(1− pCD) + w
3(1− pCD)(pDC − pDD)]R
−w2(1− pCC)(1− pDC)P }(χ− 1) + w(1 − pCC)[1− w(1 − pDD)](T − χS)
+w2(1− pCC)[pDC − w(pDC − pDD)](S − χT )
{
−w2(1 − pDC)[1− (1 − w)pCD − wpCC]P − wpCD[1− w(1 − pDD)]R
}
(χ− 1)
+w[1− (1− w)pCD − wpCC][1− w(1 − pDD)](T − χS) + (1− wpCC)[1 − w(1 − pDD)](S − χT )
w {−(1− pDC)(1 − wpCC)P − wpCD[(1− w)pDC + wpDD]R} (χ− 1)
+(1− wpCC)[1− w(1 − pDD)](T − χS) + w[(1 − w)pDC + wpDD](1− wpCC)(S − χT )
{
−{1− w2pDC[1− pCD(1− w)] − wpCC(1− w
2pDC)}P − w
2pCDpDDR
}
(χ− 1)
+w2pDD[1− pCD(1− w) − wpCC](T − χS) + wpDD(1− wpCC)(S − χT )


.
(130)
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Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (130) is positive. By substituting Eq. (130) in Eq. (40),
we obtain
(1− w)p0
{{
−wpCDR+ [1 + w(1 − pCC)− w
2(pCC − pCD)]P
}
(χ− 1) + w[1 − (1− w)pCD − wpCC](T − χS)
+(1− wpCC)(S − χT )}+
{
{−1 + w2pDC[1− (1− w)pCD] + wpCC(1− w
2pDC)}P − w
2pCDpDDR
}
(χ− 1)
+w2pDD[1− (1− w)pCD − wpCC](T − χS) + wpDD(1− wpCC)(S − χT )
+{1− w2pDC + (1− w)w
2pCDpDC + wpDD(1 + w + w
2pCD)− wpCC[1− w
2pDC + (1 + w)wpDD]}(χ− 1)κ = 0.
(131)
By substituting κ = P and χ = −(P − S)/(T − P ) in Eq. (131), we obtain
w[(1 − w)p0 + wpDD] {pCD[R− (1 − w)(T + S)] + (1− wpCC)(T + S)− [2− pCD − 2w(pCC − pCD)]P} (T − S)
T − P
= 0.
(132)
By substituting p0 = pCC = pDD = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S −R− P ) in Eq. (132), we obtain
[−pCD(T + S −R − P ) + T + S − 2P ] [−w(T + S − 2P ) + T + S −R− P ] (T + S − 2P )
(T + S −R− P )2
= 0. (133)
If −w(T + S − 2P ) + T + S −R− P = 0, Eq. (120) implies that w = 1/p0, i.e., w = p0 = 1, which contradicts
0 < w < 1. Because we decided to treat the case T + S − 2P = 0 later, Eq. (133), implies
pCD =
T + S − 2P
T + S −R− P
. (134)
In sum, we obtain p0 = pCC = pCD = pDC = pDD = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ) if T + S − 2P < 0.
Substitution of p0 in Eqs. (49) and (50) yields χ = −(P−S)/(T−P ) and κ = P , respectively, coinciding with the
condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the strategy p0 = pCC = pCD = pDC = pDD = (T+S−2P )/(T+S−R−P ),
where T + S − 2P < 0, is a special case of Eq. (51).
Finally, let us consider the case T + S − 2P = 0. By combining this condition with Eq. (120), we obtain
p0 = 0. By substituting T + S − 2P = 0 and p0 = 0 in Eq. (125), we obtain w(R − P )pDC = 0, which implies
that pDC = 0. By substituting T + S − 2P = 0 and p0 = 0 in Eq. (128), we obtain (1−wpCD)(R− P )pDD = 0,
which implies that pDD = 0. Because p0 = pDC = pDD = 0, the focal player X never uses pCC and pCD.
Therefore, p0 = pDC = pDD = 0 specifies a strategy. By substituting p0 = 0 in Eqs. (49) and (50) and using
T +S−2P = 0, we obtain χ = −(T −P )/(P −S) = −(P −S)/(T −P ) = −1 and κ = P , respectively, coinciding
with the condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the strategy p0 = pDC = pDD = 0 is a special case of Eq. (51).
E.2 Subcase (B): κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p0 = pCD = 1
By substituting Eqs. (116) and (117) in Eq. (91), we obtain
(1 − w)(χ− 1) [wpDD(κ−R)− wpCC(κ− P ) + w(R − P ) + κ−R] = 0. (135)
Note that 0 < w < 1. Because χ = 1 is inconsistent with κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0, Eq. (135) yields
pDD =
wpCC(κ− P )− w(R − P )− (κ−R)
w(κ−R)
(136)
provided that κ 6= R. We will deal with the case κ = R later in this section. By substituting Eqs. (116) and
(117) in Eq. (93), we obtain
(χ− 1) {wpDC(κ−R)− wpCC(χ+ 1)(κ− T ) + w [R− (χ+ 1)T + χκ] + κ−R} = 0, (137)
which yields
pDC =
wpCC(χ+ 1)(κ− T )− w [R− (χ+ 1)T + χκ]− (κ−R)
w(κ−R)
(138)
provided that κ 6= R. Therefore, we obtain
p =
(
pCC, 1,
wpCC(χ+ 1)(κ− T )− w[R − (χ+ 1)T + χκ]− (κ−R)
w(κ− R)
,
wpCC(κ− P )− w(R − P )− (κ−R)
w(κ−R)
)
, p0 = 1,
(139)
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i.e., Eq. (53), as a necessary condition for the linear relationship between the payoff of the two players, i.e.,
Eq. (16).
To verify that Eq. (53) is sufficient, we substitute Eq. (53) (i.e., Eq. (139)) in Eq. (36) to obtain
uzd =
(
0, 0, −
(1− w)(χ − 1)(κ−R)
w(1 − pCC)
, −
(1− w)(χ − 1)(κ−R)
w(1 − pCC)
)
, (140)
which is independent of q. By combining Eqs. (7), (140), and p0 = 1, we obtain v(0)u
zd = 0, i.e., Eq. (37).
Therefore, Eq. (53) is a solution that satisfies Eq. (16).
The strategy given by Eq. (53) is expressed in the form of Eq. (45) if we set φ = −w(1−pCC)/ [(κ−R)(χ− 1)]
(and use κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p0 = 1). As an example, we consider the repeated PD game defined by
R = 3, T = 5, S = −2, P = 1, and w = 0.8. We set κ = 2. Because this solution requires κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0
(Eq. (116)), we obtain χ = −4/3. If we set pCC = 0, we obtain p = (0, 1, 3/4, 3/4) and p0 = 1. This solution
cannot be represented in the form of Eq. (43) because Eq. (43) requires κ− S +χ(T − κ) 6= 0. Consistent with
this example, Eq. (45) combined with φ = −w(1 − pCC)/ [(κ−R)(χ− 1)], κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0, and p0 = 1
yields χ < 0. This can be shown as follows. By substituting κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p0 = 1 in Eq. (45), we
obtain
p =


1− φ(χ−1)(R−κ)
w
1
1− 1
w
+ φ[(χ−1)κ+T−χS]
w
1− 1
w
+ φ(χ−1)(κ−P )
w


. (141)
Because pCC ≤ 1 must hold true in Eq. (141), we obtain
φ(χ − 1)(R− κ) ≥ 0. (142)
Because pDD ≥ 0 must hold true in Eq. (141), we obtain
φ(χ− 1)(κ− P ) ≥ 0. (143)
Given φ(χ− 1) 6= 0 (section 3.2) and R > P , we find that P ≤ κ ≤ R must hold true for Eqs. (142) and (143)
to be simultaneously satisfied. Therefore, using κ− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 we obtain χ = −(κ− S)/(T − κ) < 0.
Finally, let us consider the case κ = R. By substituting κ = R in Eq. (135), we obtain wpCC(R − P ) =
w(R−P ), which implies that pCC = 1. By combining this result with Eq. (117), we obtain p0 = pCC = pCD = 1,
which implies that player X never uses pDC and pDD. Therefore, p0 = pCC = pCD = 1 specifies a strategy. By
substituting p0 = 1 in Eqs. (49) and (50), we obtain χ = −(R − S)/(T − R) and κ = R, respectively, and the
former equality coincides with Eq. (117) when κ = R. Therefore, the strategy p0 = pCC = pCD = 1 is a special
case of Eq. (51).
Appendix F Case T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0
In this section, we assume
T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0 (144)
and derive the set of strategies that satisfy Eq. (16).
By substituting Eq. (144) in Eq. (93), we obtain
(χ− 1)(κ−R) [(1− w)p0 + wpDC] = 0. (145)
Equation (144) does not allow χ = 1 because substitution of χ = 1 in Eq. (144) yields T = S, which contradicts
Eq. (2). Substitution of κ = R in Eq. (144) yields χ = −(T −R)/(R− S). Alternatively, if we set (1− w)p0 +
wpDC = 0, we obtain p0 = pDC = 0. Therefore, we consider the following two subcases, i.e., subcase (C)
specified by
κ = R (146)
and
χ = −
T −R
R− S
, (147)
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and subcase (D) specified by
T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0 (148)
and
p0 = pDC = 0. (149)
F.1 Subcase (C): κ = R and χ = −(T − R)/(R− S)
By substituting Eqs. (146) and (147) in Eq. (94), we obtain
(1− w) [1− w(pCC − pDC)] [−p0(T + S −R− P ) +R− P ] (T − S)
R− S
= 0. (150)
Equation (150) does not hold true because 0 < w < 1, (R− P )− p0(T + S −R− P ) 6= 0 due to Eq. (101), and
1− w(pCC − pDC) > 0. Therefore there is no solution in this case.
F.2 Subcase (D): T − κ+ χ(κ− S) = 0 and p0 = pDC = 0
By substituting Eqs. (148) and (149) in Eq. (91), we obtain
w(χ − 1) [wpDD(κ− S)(χ+ 1) + (1− wpCD)(κ− P )] = 0. (151)
We obtain χ 6= 1 because χ = 1 substituted in Eq. (148) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2). Therefore,
Eq. (151) implies
pCD =
wpDD(χ+ 1)(κ− S) + κ− P
w(κ− P )
(152)
provided that κ 6= P . We will deal with the case κ = P later in this section. By substituting Eqs. (148) and
(149) in Eq. (94), we obtain
(χ− 1)(1− w) [wpDD(κ− R) + (1− wpCC)(κ− P )] = 0. (153)
Because 0 < w < 1 and χ 6= 1, we obtain
pCC =
wpDD(κ−R) + κ− P
w(κ− P )
(154)
provided that κ 6= P . Therefore, we obtain
p =
(
wpDD(κ−R) + κ− P
w(κ− P )
,
wpDD(χ+ 1)(κ− S) + κ− P
w(κ− P )
, 0, pDD
)
, p0 = 0, (155)
where 0 ≤ pDD ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for the linear relationship between the payoff of the two players,
i.e., Eq. (16). In fact, we substitute pCD given by Eq. (155) in pCD given by Eq. (43) and use Eqs. (148) and
(149) to find that pCC, pDC, pDD given by Eq. (43) coincide with those given by Eq. (155). Therefore, Eq. (155)
is a special case of ZD strategies given by Eq. (43).
Finally, let us consider the case κ = P . By substituting κ = P in Eq. (153), we obtain wpDD(R − P ) = 0,
which implies that pDD = 0. By combining this result with Eq. (149), we obtain p0 = pDC = pDD = 0, which
implies that player X never uses pCC and pCD. Therefore, p0 = pDC = pDD = 0 specifies a strategy. By
substituting p0 = 0 in Eqs. (49) and (50), we obtain χ = −(T − P )/(P − S) and κ = P , respectively, and the
former equality coincides with Eq. (151) when κ = P . Therefore, the strategy p0 = pDC = pDD = 0 is a special
case of Eq. (51).
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Appendix G Minimum discount rate for χ < 0
G.1 ZD strategies with κ = P
Let us consider Eq. (56) under φ < 0 and χ < 1. In this case, we obtain Eqs. (57), (58), and (59), but with all
the inequalities flipped (i.e., ≥ instead of ≤). Then, we obtain
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
≥
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (156)
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
≥
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (157)
χ+
T − P
P − S
≥
(χ− 1)R−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
, (158)
χ+
T − P
P − S
≥
1 + χT−P
P−S
1
w
− 1
. (159)
Equations (156)–(159) yield
χ ≤−
P − S + (1− w)(R − P )
T −R+ w(R − P )
< 0, (160)
[(R − P )− (1− w)(T − P )]χ ≤R− P + (1 − w)(P − S), (161)
[w(R − P )− (1− w)(P − S)]χ ≤w(R − P ) + (1− w)(T − P ), (162)
[−(P − S) + w(T − S)]χ ≤− w(P − S) + (1− w)(T − P ), (163)
respectively. When w is sufficiently large, the coefficients of χ on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (161), (162), and
(163) are positive. In this situation, Eqs. (160)–(163) are satisfied by a sufficiently negative large χ(< 0). This
result is consistent with the previously obtained result [32].
G.2 ZD strategies with κ = R
In this section, we examine Eqs. (75), (76), and (77) under the assumption that χ < 0. First, because dg2/dχ >
0, g2 is discontinuous at χ = −(R−S)/(T−R), and g2 < 0 for −(R−S)/(T−R) < χ < 0, Eq. (76) is equivalent
to
χ < −
R− S
T −R
(164)
if w ≥ (T −R)/(T − P ) and
R− S − w(P − S)
−(T −R) + w(T − P )
< χ < −
R− S
T −R
(165)
if w < (T − R)/(T − P ). Second, using Eq. (164), dg1/dχ > 0, and that g1 is discontinuous at χ = −(R −
S)/(T −R), we find that Eq. (164) implies Eq. (75) if w ≥ (T −R)/(T − S) and that Eq. (75) is equivalent to
R− S − w(T − S)
−(T −R) + w(T − S)
< χ < −
R− S
T −R
(166)
if w < (T − R)/(T − S). Third, because d(g2/g1)/dχ > 0, g2/g1 is discontinuous at χ = −(T − R)/(R − S),
and g2/g1 < 0 for −(T −R)/(R− S) < χ < 0, Eq. (77) is equivalent to
χ < −
T −R
R− S
(167)
if w ≥ (P − S)/(R− S) and
T − P − w(T −R)
−(P − S) + w(R − S)
≤ χ < −
T −R
R− S
(168)
if w < (P − S)/(R− S).
To summarize these results, if w ≥ wc, generous strategies with
χ < min
(
−
R− S
T −R
,−
T −R
R− S
)
< −1 (169)
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exist because Eq. (169) yields Eqs. (75), (76), and (77). This result is consistent with the previously obtained
results [32]. Note that we have used Eq. (3) to derive the last inequality in Eq. (169). Even if w < wc, negative
χ values that satisfy all the conditions, i.e., the set of equations out of Eqs. (164), (165), (166), (167), and (168),
corresponding to the given value of w, may exist.
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